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Preface 
Richard Feynman made a remark in his second book that provides a 
nice introduction to the topic of this special issue: 
When using a mathematical model, careful attention must be given to 
the uncertainties in the model. 
Feynman, R.P., On the reliability of the [Challenger] shuttle, What 
do You Care What Other People Think? Bantam, New York, 
224-225, 1989. 
Volume 4, number 5/6 (September 1990) of this journal was a special issue 
entitled Belief Functions and Belief Maintenance in Artificial Intelligence. 
That issue was guest edited by Prakash Shenoy and Gautam Biswas, and it 
contained six excellent articles on various aspects of the theory and current 
practice of belief functions as they impact on and are used in artificial- 
ly intelligent systems that possess and must deal with various types of un- 
certainty. Among the papers were two invited articles by Judea Pearl and 
Glenn Shafer ([P] and [S]). 
As it happened, (parts of) these papers were presented by their authors in 
1989 at the Fifth Annual Workshop on Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence; 
and the opinions expressed by the writers caused a great amount of (a) interest 
and (b) consternation among participants at the workshop. I was not there, but 
I understand that the discussions ensuing from these presentations were, in a 
word, lively. Somewhat earlier, Shenoy and Biswas were assembling their 
special issue and invited Pearl and Shafer to submit position papers on the topic 
of their special issue, which subsequently turned out to be the articles [P] and 
[S]. 
This special issue was born as a result of the intense discussions by 
workshop attendees about issues raised by and subsequently published as [P] 
and IS]. The idea for a follow-up issue on the two papers in the "comment and 
rejoinder" format was not mine; indeed, it was an idea brewed at the 
workshop by several persons, of whom I can specifically mention Mary 
Deutsch-McLeish, Didier Dubois, Philippe Smets, and Ron Yager (if there 
were others, I apologize a priori for omitting their names; it is merely an 
omission of ignorance on my part). Originally, the follow-up issue was headed 
for Ron Yager's International Journal of Intelligent Systems, but after some 
deliberation about the wisdom of "crossing journals" with a pair of related 
issues, Ron most graciously agreed that IJAR would be a natural forum for this 
issue. I would here like to especially thank Ron for his guidance and advice 
about the matter and for his professional pproach to the business of academic 
publication. 
With this preamble, not much more needs to be said. This issue contains 
seven critical assessments of the Pearl and Shafer papers. Dubois and Prade, 
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Smets, and Wilson provide critical appraisals of [P]; Wasserman and Wilson 
do the same for [S]; and Provan and Ruspini, Lowrance, and Strat write 
unified critiques of both papers. Following this, Pearl and Shafer each provide 
a rejoinder to comments made in the preceding papers. Readers may wonder 
about the "ground rules" for this issue. They were mine, and they were 
simple. None of the papers were refereed--they are opinion papers (but 
hopefully loaded with "facts"); and once submitted, they were not altered, nor 
were they alterable by their authors. I thought about giving each of the seven 
reviewers of [P] and [S] an opportunity to make "rejoinders to the rejoinders," 
but this seemed to lead in the direction on an infinitely extensible issue, so each 
writer was given only one shot. There will undoubtedly be further discussions 
and issues to argue, and perhaps to resolve. That is both predictable and 
desirable, for it is the method of science to continually sift, refine, improve, 
and discard ideas as we evolve continually toward more and more useful 
models of our world and its processes. Scientific journals should promote the 
free and open exchange of ideas, good and bad, and it is my hope that this 
issue serves that purpose. 
Working on the compilation of this special issue has been enjoyable, and in 
this regard I would like to publicly recognize the assistance and support of the 
authors themselves. Their patience, persistence, and foresight are, in large 
measure, responsible for this special issue. 
Jim Bezdek 
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